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Religious Accommodation: An Often Delicate Task
Lee Boothby' and Robert W. Nixon2
As our society has become more complex, industrialized, and
impersonal, it has become correspondingly more difficult for individ-
uals to find employment where their religious needs are voluntarily
accommodated. Many have faced the economic hardships of unem-
ployment as a result of their religious convictions. Others have faced
similar hardships when their religious beliefs conflicted with state
regulations in areas such as taxation and education.
Accordingly, courts and legislatures increasingly have been
called upon to accommodate religious beliefs and practices. In United
States v. Lee,3 which involved the question of whether the free exercise
clause of the first amendment prohibits the forced payment of social
security taxes by an Old Order Amish employer when the payments
violated his religious beliefs, the Supreme Court of the United States
recently stated: "Religious beliefs can be accommodated, . . . but
there is a point at which accommodations would 'radically restrict
the operating latitude of the legislature.' ,,4 The Court recognized
that "'to make accommodation between the religious action and an
exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task. . . because
resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual
of either abandoning his religious principle or facing . . . prosecu-
tion.' "5 However, "[n]ot all burdens on religion are unconstitutional
.* . . The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by show-
ing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest. ' '6
I Undergraduate work, Andrews University; J.D., Wayne State University, 1957.
Member of Michigan bar, with offices at 1310 St. Joseph Road, Berrien Springs, Michigan
49103. Mr. Boothby has been involved in church-state conflict cases for ten years and is a
recognized authority on the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
2 B. A., Columbia Union College, 1961. M.S., Boston University, 1964. J.D., Washing-
ton College of Law of American University, 1974. Offices at 6840 Eastern Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20012.
3 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
4 Id at 1056 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
5 Id (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).
6 Id at 1055.
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I. The Spectrum of Accommodation
The Supreme Court has addressed religious accommodation in a
broad spectrum of situations. It has granted unemployment compen-
sation to a Seventh-day Adventist 7 and a Jehovah's Witness8 who
had been denied compensation after refusing to take jobs conflicting
with religious beliefs. It has exempted the Old Order Amish from
certain compulsory education laws,9 and dissenters from the draft.'0
However, the court has limited religious freedom when confronted
by issues in which it considers the government to have an overriding
interest, including polygamy," child labor,' 2 and tax collection.' 3
Congress has legislatively decreed a few, wide-ranging religious
accommodations. These include exemptions from social security
taxes, 14 from the draft,' 5 from labor union dues and fees,' 6 and from
compulsive participation in abortions for objecting employees. ' 7 The
greatest number of religious accommodations are made under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against any individual because of that indi-
vidual's religion.' 8 In addition, Congress stated that it is an unlawful
employment practice for a labor organization to discriminate against an
individual because of his religion or to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 9
7 Sherbert v. Verner, 473 U.S. 398 (1963).
8 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
9 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
11 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (bigamy statute enforced against
Mormon).
12 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor law enforced against minor
distributing Jehovah's Witness literature).
13 United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
14 26 U.S.C. § 1402(e), (g) (1976).
15 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1976).
16 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1976).
17 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1976).
18 Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). The key provision in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), provides that
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ..
19 This section provides as follows:
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization -
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership,
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In 1967, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion adopted Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion.
These guidelines decreed that the duty not to discriminate on reli-
gious grounds includes an additional obligation on the part of the
employer to accommodate the religious practices of his employees or
prospective employees so long as accommodation does not impose an
undue hardship on the employer.20
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to require specifically that
reasonable accommodation must be made for an individual's reli-
gious observance, practice, and belief, if accommodation could be
done reasonably and without undue hardship to the employer. The
1972 amendment provides:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospec-
tive employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. 21
II.. Constitutional Issues in Accommodation
Any religious accommodation, whether by court order or legisla-
tive enactment, must be measured against constitutional standards.
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... 22 The Supreme Court has recognized "the governmen-
tal obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences. 23 Re-
alization of this stated objective of neutrality often raises important
constitutional concerns.
Although the free exercise clause prohibits the government from
imposing restrictions on religious practice, a state may justify a bur-
or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an indi-
vidual in violation of this section.
20 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1980).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) [§ 7010)] (1976).
Although there was considerable disagreement in the Congress as to the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the subsequent amendments thereto, the adoption of the 1972
amendment was affected without dissent in the Senate.
22 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
23 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
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den on the free exercise of religion "by showing that it is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest." 24 The Supreme
Court applied this standard in United States v. Lee, 25 where an Amish
farmer who refused on religious grounds to pay employer's social se-
curity taxes contended that the failure to accommodate his beliefs is
prohibited by the free exercise clause. Lee attempted to extend to
Amish who employ other Amish the § 1402(g) 26 exemption from so-
cial security taxes granted by Congress to self-employed members of
religious groups. The Supreme Court recognized the vital govern-
mental interest in the social security system and stated that
"[b]ecause the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax sys-
tem is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the pay-
ment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax."27 The Court also
based its refusal to exempt Lee from social security taxes upon the
distinction between self-employed Amish and the employees of
Amish employers, finding that while self-employed Amish are a nar-
row, readily identified category, employees of the Amish are mem-
bers of the general class of "wage earners employed by others,"
against whom the social security system must uniformly apply.28
Although free exercise concerns are inherent in any question of
religious accommodation, the controversy surrounding accommoda-
tion centers on whether religious accommodation violates the estab-
lishment clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,29 the Supreme Court
enunciated a three-part test for determining whether a statute is per-
missible under the establishment clause. The test provides that
"[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . . .; finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.' "30
Two United States Courts of Appeal haste recently applied the
Lemon v. Kurtzman test to uphold the constitutionality of Title VII's
accommodation requirement. The Seventh Circuit in Nottelson v.
Smith Steel Workers D.A.L. U 31 and the Ninth Circuit in Toole) v. Mar-
24 United States v. Lee, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1055 (1982).
25 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
26 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1976).
27 102 S. Ct. at 1056.
28 Id at 1057.
29 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30 Id at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
31 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981) (Seventh-day Adventist alleging religious discrimination
after being discharged for failing to contribute to the union).
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tin-Maietta Corp. 32 ruled that such accommodation does not violate
the establishment clause, and the Supreme Court denied petitions for
writs of certiorari. 33 The Supreme Court also dismissed appeal from
a California case, Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence,34 in
which the California Supreme Court similarly upheld accommoda-
tion to employees' religious practices against establishment clause
challenges.
III. Accommodation Under Title VII
A. The Range of Title VIZ Claims
Religious discrimination generally involves a one-on-one situa-
tion. For instance, one person in a plant may wish to be excused
from work on Sunday or Saturday in order to observe his Sabbath.35
The individual focus of religious discrimination distinguishes it from
other legislatively protected areas of Title VII. Discrimination on
the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin usually affects a sub-
stantially large and identifiable class, and class actions abound. In
contrast, the religious accommodation standard written into law in
1972 requires the courts to weigh the impact of certain employment
practices on a spe.fi individual's religious practices and then fashion
an individual remedy. Accordingly, the nature of religiously based
Title VII claims and the remedies sought vary widely from case to
case.
Most claims filed under the religious accommodation provisions
of Title VII involve employees objecting to Sabbath employment 36
or membership in or financial support of labor organizations.3 7
32 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981) (Seventh-day Adventist seeking to enjoin attempted
discharge after failing to pay union dues).
33 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 671
(1981); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U., 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S.Ct. 587 (1981).
34 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, appeal disrmirsed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979).
35 Sabbatarians have long faced the "built-in headwinds" of an employment policy that
requires employees, particularly new employees, to work on Friday night or Saturday. This
practice operates to exclude Sabbatarians from employment. To a lesser degree, since many
industries close down or only employ skeleton staffs on Sunday, those who refrain from any
secular work on Sunday have similar problems.
36 Jordon v. North Carolina'Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry
Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972);
Kendall v. United Airlines, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1380 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Padon v. White, 465 F.
Supp. 602 (S.D. Texas 1979); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375
(W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 560 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1977).
37 Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.
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However, Title VII has also been applied to other religious concerns.
A California case held that the U.S. Postal Service had discrimi-
nated against an individual who refused to distribute draft registra-
tion materials. 38 The Third Circuit ruled that an employer must
accommodate a Jehovah's Witness whose religious beliefs proscribed
the raising and lowering of the flag.39 A District of Columbia court
held that Title VII covered a Roman Catholic Internal Revenue
Service tax law specialist who had been refused promotion because of
his religious objection to processing applications for tax exempt sta-
tus of abortion and homosexual organizations. 40 The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that Title VII was violated when an Orthodox Jew was not
permitted to take a Civil Service examination on a day other than his
Sabbath.4t The Fifth Circuit held that the religious accommodation
provision of Title VII protected an atheist whose employer required
her to attend a prayer meeting during working hours.42
In addition, the Seventh Circuit has held that the prohibition in
Title VII of discrimination based on "religion" is not limited to reli-
gious observances and practices specifically mandated or prohibited
by a tenet of an employee's religion. It also protects conduct which is
religiously motivated.43
B. Finding Religious Discrimination
Chief Justice Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 44 stated that the
objective of Title VII was to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities. In arriving at the proper legal definition of the term "dis-
crimination" in a Title VII racial discrimination case, the Court in
Grggs rejected the concept of "ill will." It also held that the term
meant more than "unequal treatment."
1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981); Nottleson v. Smith
Steel Workers, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 P.2d
403, 405 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571
F.2d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978); Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 533
F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976).
38 McGinnis v. United States Postal Serv., 24 FEP Cas. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
39 Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980).
40 Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979).
41 Minkus v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 600 F.2d 80 (7th Cir. 1979).
42 Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
43 Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1978). Of passing interest is a
case holding that plantiff's "personal religious creed" that "Kozy Kitten People/Cat Food"
contributed significantly to his well being, and therefore to his work performance, was merely
a personal preference beyond the parameters of the concept of religion as protected by the
Constitution and Title VII. Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
44 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Although ill will and unequal treatment are illegal discrimina-
tory practices, the Court held that Title VII is also directed against
the "consequences" or "effects" of an employment system. Accord-
ing to Griggs, if an employment practice operates to exclude a minor-
ity, it is illegally discriminatory. "The Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. '45 The
Court also held that good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem a system which operates as "built-in headwinds" for
minority groups.46
The accommodation requirement of Title VII extends the con-
sequences test of Griggs to prohibit present discriminatory conse-
quences of present employment practices. This extension was
necessary because religious discrimination in employment does not
always stem from pervasive historical and social patterns of discrimi-
nation. If Title VII prohibited only the present effects of past reli-
gious discrimination, the Act would have little impact, and no
remedy would exist for discriminatory practices by new employers or
by employers having no history of past discrimination.
In Robinson v. Lorillard,47 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit stated:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. . . and there must be available no accepta-
ble alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a
lesser differential racial impact. 48
Employers and labor organizations must, therefore, ask whether
their current policies and practices produce present discriminatory
effects, and seek to ascertain whether their legitimate business con-
cerns may be accomplished equally well with a lesser differential im-
pact. They must make a good-faith search for alternate ways to
accomplish their business purpose when an existing employment pol-
icy establishes a built-in headwind for a minority. Thus, to -with-
stand a Title VII challenge, an employer maintaining a system
adversely affecting Sabbath-keepers must establish that an alternate
practice is not available to accommodate the class.
45 Id at 431.
46 Id at 432.
47 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
48 444 F.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
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To establish aprimafaie case of religious discrimination under
Title VII the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a bona fide reli-
gious belief impacted by the employment-related action complained
of, (2) that he or she gave notice of the religious belief and conflict to
the defendant, and (3) the discharge or other adverse action com-
plained of. 49
The burden of persuasion thereupon shifts to the defendant
company or labor organization to demonstrate that it made a good-
faith effort to accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs and that
its efforts were unsuccessful. The employer or labor organization
must demonstrate that it was unable to reasonably accommodate the
plaintiff's beliefs without undue hardship. 50 Proof of the defendant's
effort to accommodate the employee's religious practices is required
before the defendant may raise the further defense of undue
hardship.51
C. The Defense of Undue Hardship
Since what constitutes "undue hardship" is not set forth with
clearly defined parameters, the resolution of this issue turns on the
particular facts of each case.52 The Sixth Circuit, in Draper v. United
States Pobe & Foundy Co. ,53 explained that:
'[U]ndue hardship is something greater than hardship,' and an em-
ployer does not sustain his burden of proof merely by showing that
an accommodation would be bothersome to administer or disrup-
tive of the operating routine. In addition, we are somewhat skepti-
cal of hypothetical hardships that an empldyer thinks might be
caused by an accommodation that never has been put into
practice.54
The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison55 ad-
dressed the scope of Title VII's reasonable accommodation/undue
hardship standard. In Hardison, a Sabbatarian alleged religious dis-
crimination after his employer failed to accommodate his religious
49 Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 928 (1980).
50 Burns v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1072 (1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978).
51 McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Claybaugh
v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Ore. 1973).
52 Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1978); Draper v. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
53 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975).
54 Id at 520.
55 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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beliefs to allow him Saturdays off. TWA had attempted to accom-
modate the employee by searching for someone who would volunta-
rily trade shifts, but because of the seniority system could not force
another employee to switch shifts with Hardison. The Court of Ap-
peals suggested that TWA could have replaced Hardison with super-
visory personnel or personnel from other departments, or could
alternatively have paid other employees premium wages to take the
Saturday shift.
The Supreme Court stated that both alternatives "would in-
volve costs to TWA, either in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs
or higher wages. 56 It ruled that to require an employer to bear more
than de minim&s cost would constitute undue hardship 57 and that ab-
sent clear congressional intent, seniority provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement need not yield to an accommodation. 58
D. Guidei'nes on Discrimzination Because of Religion
After the Court's Hardison decision in 1977, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission became concerned about apparent
confusion over what kinds of religious accommodation were required
from employers and labor organizations. 59 After hearings in New
York City, Milwaukee, and Los Angeles, the Commission found that
various kinds of religious practices were not being accommodated
and issued new Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion,
which became effective on November 1, 1980.60
The new guidelines broadly define religious beliefs and prac-
tices. 61 They set out the statutory duty to make reasonable accom-
modations and outline two factors the EEOC will consider in
determining whether an offered accommodation was reasonable: (1)
examination of the alternatives offered the employee and (2) whether
56 Id at 84.
57 Id
58 Id at 79-80.
59 Hearings before the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on
Religious Accommodation, at 2 (1978).
60 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1977), as amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 72,610 (1980) (effective Nov. 1,
1980).
61 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1981). The Commission defines religious practices to include:
moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with
the strength of traditional religious views . . . ". The fact that no religious group
espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief
is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee. The phrase "religious
practice" as used in these Guidelines includes both religious observances and
practices ....
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the employer and/or labor organization offered the alternative that
least disadvantaged the employee. 62 The new guidelines suggest use
of voluntary substitutes and shift swaps, flexible scheduling, holiday
and work breaks, and lateral transfers and changes of job assign-
ments as possible measures of accommodation. The guidelines spe-
cifically urge labor organizations and employers to accommodate
employees who for religious reasons cannot financially support labor
organizations to pay an amount equivalent to dues to a charity. 63
As for the de minimis cost factor enunciated in Hardison, the
guidelines state that the Commission will consider the cost involved
in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer and the
number of employees needing accommodation. The guidelines pro-
vide that an employer can be required to pay, on an infrequent basis,
premium wages for a substitute worker while a permanent accommo-
dation is being sought. Administrative costs in seeking an accommo-
dation do not constitute more than a de minimis cost.6 4
Recognizing conflicts with seniority rights, the guidelines en-
courage employers and labor organizations to include arrangements
for voluntary substitutes and swaps in collective bargaining agree-
ments.65 The guidelines also suggest that employment tests and se-
lection procedures given at times that exclude participation by
religious minorities, and preselection inquiries about an applicant's
availability have an exclusionary effect on employment opportunities
for certain religious groups.
66
E. Special Problems Presented by Collective Bargaining
As the facts of Hardison and the EEOC Guidelines suggest, many
of the problems faced today by religious minorities arise from the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which permits a labor organi-
zation to represent all employees within a bargaining unit as to the
terms and conditions of employment.67 A company and union by
agreement may cast conditions of employment which make accom-
modation for Sabbatarians, for instance, difficult, if not impossible.
Union security provisions in labor agreements usually demand
financial support of the labor organization regardless of an em-
ployee's religious beliefs.
62 § 1605.2 (1981).
63 § 1605.2(d).
64 § 1605.2(e)(1).
65 § 1605.2(e)(2).
66 § 1605.3.
67 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
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These collective bargaining agreements generally provide for
such items as mandatory union membership or agency fees, a pre-
scribed grievance procedure handled by the union, seniority rights,
work schedule and shift preference, promotions, wages and hours,
and other items and conditions. Typical of the collective bargaining
agreement is a provision that senior employees be given shift prefer-
ence over employees with less seniority. Seniority also generally con-
trols layoffs and recalls. When layoffs occur, employees having the
highest seniority are to be given the available work. Such provisions
often provide that in the event of a layoff, if the employee having
seniority refuses to change his shift to another shift, he shall be laid
off.
The theory of the inviolability of the seniority clause contained
in a collective bargaining agreement grows out of the principle of
majority rule. One may well question, however, whether the doc-
trine of majority rule should be permitted to extinguish individual
interests based upon religious convictions, when the Congress has re-
quired equal employment opportunity to be of high priority in the
national labor policy.
It is right and proper for Congress to have given particular at-
tention to the religious needs of employees when Congress itself
granted unions the power to be the exclusive representative of all
employees within a specified employment unit. When Congress, by
such legislation, made it more difficult for the individual to arrange
with his employer for his particular religious needs, it effectively in-
hibited the accommodation of an individual's religious practices. It
is therefore proper for the Congress, by remedial legislation, to re-
quire the union, as well as the employer, to accommodate- the indi-
vidual employee's religious needs.
Given the unequal bargaining power of the parties and the eco-
nomic dependence of the employee, the employer's inflexibility in its
employment policies can have a chilling effect on the employee's free-
dom to complain and negotiate. When there is not only inflexibility
on the part of the employer but also an inflexible collective bargain-
ing agreement that precludes any reasonable accommodation, the
employee faces almost insurmountable difficulties.
Considering the labor organization's duty of fair representation
in the context of Title VII, the labor organization has the legal duty
to bargain in good faith concerning the elimination of actual or sus-
pected discrimination. The labor organization has the legal duty to
bargain in good faith to include provisions in labor contracts that
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will permit the employer to accommodate the religious needs of its
employees.
Employers and labor organizations should be put on notice that
a collective bargaining agreement that is so inflexible as to prevent
any accommodation for the religious needs of Sabbatarians is per se
illegal. The employer and the union should at least have the burden
of establishing why a collective bargaining agreement, in order to
satisfy the overriding legitimate business purposes of the employer
and the union, had to be drafted so as to eliminate any acceptable
alternative for the religious needs of employees.
IV. Conclusion
Courts and legislatures, along with employers and labor organi-
zations, must recognize the special needs and circumstances arising
from an individual's religious beliefs. Religious accommodation, as
circumscribed by constitutional standards and statutory provisions, is
vital to protect the interests of those who, as Thoreau put it, march to
the beat of a different drummer.68 However delicate the task, it is to
the benefit of this great nation that we provide a home and haven for
religious thought and practice.
68 Thoreau, Walden 222 (Riverside ed. 1960).
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